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A Pragmatic Syntax of Counterfactual Mood Attraction and Mood (a)symmetry from Archaic to Classical Greek

Abstract: Ancient Greek has been said to have a form of morphosyntactic symmetry called mood attraction or mood assimilation where a subordinate clause was formally assimilated to the same mood as the matrix clause (i.e. an optative, indicative or subjunctive with certain temporal reference limitations). As counterproposal, this article uses a corpus study of Archaic (VIII-VBC) and Classical Greek (V-IVBC) to demonstrate that this aspect of modal syntax is in fact pragmatically conditioned. Subordinate clauses in counterfactual mood attraction do not need the expected modal particle (*án/ke(n)*) because they obtain their counterfactuality via transfer of counterfactual implicature from the matrix clause. This transfer resembles how counterfactual matrix clauses receive counterfactual implicature from preceding counterfactual conditionals, because transfer only takes place with (i) temporally iconic subordinate clauses with a causal connection, (ii) the negative or positive polarity of the matrix clause is also transferred, and (iii) both the counterfactual optative (in Archaic) and indicative (in Archaic and Classical Greek) can be found in the matrix and subordinate clause, even asymmetrically in Archaic Greek. Furthermore, non-counterfactual mood symmetry with the optative or subjunctive is also pragmatically conditioned, as choosing a symmetrical mood in the subordinate clause has both a pragmatic and semantic motivation, just as when it is asymmetrically marked by mood in the so-called oblique optative.

Keywords: counterfactuality, mood attraction, implicature, iconicity, mood, polarity, temporal reference, modal particle

1 The syntax of mood attraction in Ancient Greek

In Ancient Greek the mood of a subordinate clause can be "assimilated" or "attracted" to the mood of the main clause (to an optative, indicative or, rarely, a subjunctive mood, a phenomenon called mood attraction or mood assimilation (Napoli 2014). Napoli defines it as follows: "Mood attraction (or 'modal assimilation', as it is also called) takes place when the mood of a verb occurring in a subordinate clause, which may be dependent or sub-dependent,

is *assimilated to the mood of the matrix clause*. In other words, one does not find *the expected mood* in a given subordinate clause, but *the same mood* as in the corresponding matrix clause" (Napoli 2014, my italics). Mood attraction occurs with three different moods (in order of decreasing frequency): (i) attraction to the optative, (ii) attraction to the counterfactual[1] indicative, and, most rarely, (iii) attraction to the subjunctive. Since the mood in the subordinate clause is, as it were, unexpectedly matched with the mood in the matrix clause, this phenomenon can be called a symmetrical mood phenomenon. As such, it contrasts with the asymmetrical phenomenon of the so-called oblique optative (Duhoux 1992: 43), where researchers at least agree that the optative is found in a subordinate clause after a past indicative for a pragmatic reason (e.g. as reportative evidential, indirect speech, perspectival effect).[2]

An aspect of mood attraction that has not received much attention is how the counterfactual types of mood attraction fit into the phenomenon of mood attraction in Ancient Greek more generally. After all, both the optative and the indicative were used counterfactually in Archaic Greek (la Roi 2022a with references), which opens up the theoretical possibility that they were both used in mood attraction after a counterfactual matrix clause (whether in the counterfactual optative or counterfactual indicative). However, such cases are not admitted into standard definitions of mood attraction, since mood attraction to the optative is only said to happen when the matrix clause with the optative refers to the non-counterfactual future, in potential or wish use (e.g. Smyth and Messing 1968: 489 and Napoli 2014). In other words, the notion of "expected mood" is also problematically based on temporal reference grounds, excluding counterfactual uses of the optative that refer to the past or present, or non-counterfactual potential optatives that refer to the present[3] from mood attraction. Since the most frequent uses of mood attraction occur with the optative and the indicative, and they are also used for counterfactuality in different clause types in Ancient Greek, a diachronic study of the use of counterfactual mood attraction with the optative and the indicative could yield insights relevant to the diachronic syntax of counterfactuality, mood attraction and the syntactic and pragmatic conditions of mood usage in both Archaic and Classical Greek.

Furthermore, the distribution of mood attraction with the optative and indicative is allegedly limited to certain subordinate clause types (e.g. the optative to temporal, conditional

[1] A sentence or clause is generally called counterfactual (or contrary-to-fact) when it is implied or assumed that what is said does not hold in the actual world (cf. Declerck and Reed 2001: 7; Dancygier 2006: 25).
[2] I am aware that the origins and pragmatic value of the oblique optative construction is debated within Ancient Greek linguistics. The effects mentioned here are based on some of the analyses given of the construction, cf. Mendez Dosuna (1999), Faure (2014) and Lillo (2017).
[3] Some grammars falsely suggest that the potential optative always refers to the future (*pace* van Emde Boas *et al.* 2019: 436), but see Wakker (1994: 211).

relative clauses if antecedent has an indefinite, final, interrogative indirect clauses as equivalent of dubitative subjunctive, and relative clauses of purpose), but the reasons for that are unaddressed thus far. By contrast, counterfactual mood attraction with the counterfactual indicative (i.e. when the indicative is used counterfactually in non-conditional[4] subordinate clauses without its expected modal particle (*án/ke(n)*), Kühner and Gerth 1898: 259) is said to occur with conditional relative clauses, temporal clauses and final clauses (Napoli 2014). Yet, it can actually be found with other subordinate clause types as well, as in the comparative subordinate clause type of example (1). In this example, the comparative clause refers to the counterfactual past in which Aminias would have knowingly sought to catch Artemisia in that ship. Rather than marking the counterfactuality of the indicatives in the non-conditional subordinate clause using an expected modal particle, it is "assimilated" to the same counterfactual function as the indicative mood in the matrix clause. Note how the matrix clause does have the expected modal particle, following morphosyntactic rules of the mood system of Ancient Greek (see discussion below in table 1).

(1)	[εἰ μέν νυν ἔμαθε ὅτι ἐν ταύτῃ πλέοι Ἀρτεμισίη,] **οὐκ ἂν ἐπαύσατο πρότερον ἢ εἷλέ** μιν ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς **ἥλω**. (Hdt. 8.93.5-6)					
	ouk	*an*	*epaúsato*	*próteron*	*e:*	*heîlé*
	NEG	MOD	stop-3SG.IND.AOR	sooner	than	capture-3SG.IND.AOR
	min	*e:*	*kai*	*autos*		*hé:lo:*
	he-ACC	or	PTCL	self-NOM		be.caught-3SG.IND.AOR
	'[If he had known that Artemisia was in that ship,] **he would not have stopped earlier** than that he captured it or was captured himself.'[5]					

In addition to such undiscovered distributional aspects, existing hypotheses about mood attraction cannot fully explain counterfactual mood attraction yet as (1) a mechanical formal phenomenon because a symmetrically marked sentence can have a counterfactual matrix clause but a non-counterfactual subordinate clause (ex. 3), nor (2) semantically as caused by the main clause verb as a variety of counterfactual verb forms occur in cases of counterfactual mood

[4] In Archaic and Classical Greek conditional clauses and some Archaic Greek comparative clauses formed like conditionals with *ho:s ei* 'as if', the modal particle is not necessary, see la Roi (2022a).

[5] The translations in this article are based on the most recent Loeb translations available via https://www.loebclassics.com/

attraction (see section 2 and 3), nor (3) through a combination of the above and stylistic factors[6] since the attracted subordinate clauses have a variety of values per mood.

Therefore, I argue, we should try and separate the different aspects of mood attraction in order to distinguish between factors that contribute to mood attraction and factors that determine mood attraction, both morphosyntactic and pragmatic. Accordingly, I propose to distinguish between formal optative mood attraction (FOMA), formal indicative mood attraction (FIMA) and pragmatic counterfactuality transfer (PCT). Formal mood attraction (FOMA and FIMA) refers to the traditional conception of mood attraction, i.e. the attraction to the same mood as the matrix clause instead of the "expected mood". For the counterfactual indicative and optative this means that, as shown in the lowest row of table 1 below, a modal particle is not necessary to mark counterfactuality in non-conditional subordinate clauses when we have a case of counterfactual mood attraction; conversely, when there is no counterfactual mood attraction from the matrix clause, i.e. "attracting" a counterfactual mood use without the modal particle, a modal particle is needed to mark a mood as counterfactual in non-conditional subordinate clauses (for explanations see section 2 and 3). The absence of the modal particle in such clauses, I suggest, indicates that their counterfactuality is obtained from their matrix clause (see below in section 2 and 3). Pragmatic counterfactuality transfer (PCT) thus refers to those subordinate clauses which have a counterfactual meaning without the modal particle because they gained their counterfactual meaning from the matrix clause. As shown by the overview in table 1, the modal particles (*án/ke(n)*) play a crucial part of the mood system in Ancient Greek in signalling the modal value of a clause. They have obligatory usages, as in the counterfactual mood usages in table 1[7], and optional usages, as with the potential optative in main clauses (la Roi 2023).

Table 1: Counterfactual mood strategies in Ancient Greek

Illocution	**Archaic Greek**		**Classical Greek**
	Counterfactual optative	Counterfactual indicative	Counterfactual indicative
Wish	• wish optative • insubordinate wishes with the optative (*aíthe, aí gár, ei gár eíthe or ei*)	• insubordinate *aíthe, ho:s* with *ó:phel(l)lon* • *ó:phel(l)lon*	• insubordinate *ei gár, eíthe, ho:s* with *ó:phel(l)lon* • *ó:phel(l)lon*

[6] E.g. Amigues (1977: 205–224) or Napoli (2014) who states "often, it rather represents only a matter of stylistic choice".

[7] An exception is the infrequent construction of an adverb meaning 'almost' (e.g. *olígou*) with a past indicative which together yield a counterfactual implicature (*he almost won=he did not win*), for which see la Roi 2023.

			• insubordinate *ei gár, eíthe* with past indicative
Declarative	• optative with modal particles *án/ke*(*n*)	• past indicative with modal particles *án/ke*(*n*)	• past indicative with modal particle *án*
Interrogative	• optative with modal particle *ken* (1x)		
De-activated (conditional)	• optative	• past indicative	• past indicative
De-activated (non-conditional)	• optative with modal particles *án/ke*(*n*) • [*optative in attraction*]	• past indicative with modal particles *án/ke*(*n*) • [*indicative in attraction*]	• past indicative with modal particle *án* • [*indicative in attraction*]

Note that the overview focuses on mood forms and leaves out the many counterfactual modal verbs such as (*e*)*khre:n* 'it should', *édei* 'it ought', *eboulóme:n* 'I wished' (see Revuelta Puigdollers 2017 for a recent overview) which do not, strictly speaking, need a modal particle to be used counterfactually. Space also prevents me from discussing many of the diachronic changes shown by counterfactual markers from Archaic Greek to Classical Greek, e.g. changes in temporal reference from past to present by all aspects, clause type extensions (see la Roi 2022a) or the creation of insubordinate counterfactual alternatives to counterfactual wish illocutions based on mood only (la Roi 2021). Still, the present study can investigate whether the cases of counterfactual mood attraction play any role for the development of counterfactual strategies more generally (see section 3). The de-activated label (in the last two rows) refers to the use of counterfactual mood forms in subordinate clauses, as they prototypically take part in the illocutionary force of their matrix clause, e.g. declarative 'I walked to the shop so that I could buy bread' or interrogative 'Can I go the shop if it's a Sunday?' (see la Roi 2021).

This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 and 3 discuss counterfactual mood attraction from a pragmatic perspective, respectively in Archaic and Classical Greek. Subsequently, section 4 seeks to move beyond traditional explanations of mood attraction and suggest that we can do without this formal and temporal reference based notion. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. This study is based on a corpus-based analysis of counterfactual mood attraction in Ancient Greek, comparing Archaic Greek (Homer, Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns) and Classical Greek texts (the three tragedians, Aristophanes, the histories of Thucydides, Herodotus and Xenophon, the authentic Platonic dialogues and the orators Lysias,

Isocrates, Isaeus and Demosthenes). Using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, I collected those cases in which a non-conditional subordinate clause in the optative or indicative without the modal particle followed a counterfactual matrix clause (126 examples). These I subsequently analysed for counterfactual mood attraction. To maximize coverage, I also checked the examples given in the standard grammars listed at the end of this paper.

2 Counterfactual mood attraction in Archaic Greek

In Archaic Greek, the counterfactual optative is used especially to refer to the present (and sometimes the future), but there are also still some archaic past-referring uses in Homer which are being replaced by the counterfactual indicative diachronically, e.g. in relative clauses and in declarative or interrogative main clauses (la Roi 2022a). In the example below from the *Iliad*, a past-referring counterfactual optative in the matrix clause (*onósaito*) is followed by past-referring counterfactual optatives in its subordinate relative clause which express what no such man would have done (as he could not have). Traditional grammars have called such past counterfactual uses a past potential usage but Wakker (1994: 156–166) has convincingly shown that these uses have a counterfactual implicature in context. To illustrate, in example (2) the Homeric narrator wants to suggest to the reader that it was impossible that any man would have made light of it and moved through there, because the fighting was that intense back then. Oddly enough, Wakker (1994: 161) does admit the existence of the past potential construction from a diachronic perspective to understand the creation of the past habitual construction with the modal particle *án*. Therefore, la Roi (2022b) has now suggested that the past habitual developed directly from the past counterfactual through an invited inference of epistemic certainty (what certainly would have happened in the past > must have happened regularly in the past) as also revealed by the existence of counterfactual habitual examples (see the preceding context of example (4)) and the use of both the imperfect and aorist aspect in the past habitual construction in Classical Greek, as past counterfactual indicatives did in Archaic Greek (la Roi 2022a).

Despite the symmetry of optatives in this example, they would not fall under FOMA in the traditional definition due to their past-temporal reference. However, they do fall under the more inclusive notion of PCT, since both the matrix and the subordinate clause that lacks a modal particle refer to the counterfactual past that the narrator is talking about.[8] The use of different aspectual forms with the past-referring counterfactual optatives in the matrix and

[8] For another example of PCT with counterfactual optatives in matrix and subordinate relative clause, see *Il.* 13.344. A variant with counterfactual indicatives is *Od.* 1.217.

subordinate clause serve to provide the fitting aspectual construal (see la Roi 2022a): a bounded construal of making light of something (*onósaito*) and an unbounded construal of moving and being guarded during the battle (*dineúoi* & *aperúkoi*). In fact, the counterfactuality of the matrix clause optative is transferred pragmatically to the subordinate clause optatives via a counterfactual implicature, because the statement that *a man* could *not* have entered this intense battle and made light of it *implicates* that *nobody would have* easily moved through it unwounded and protected by Athena. In other words, the state of affairs expressed by the optative in the matrix clause (M) as well as those in the subordinate relative clause (S) belong to the same counterfactual world by (scalar) counterfactual implicature[9]: (M) not a could have > nobody could have M and therefore not have S.

(2)	Ἔνθά **κεν** οὐκέτι ἔργον ἀνὴρ **ὀνόσαιτο μετελθών, / ὅς τις** ἔτ’ ἄβλητος καὶ ἀνούτατος ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ / **δινεύοι** κατὰ μέσσον, **ἄγοι** δέ ἑ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη / χειρὸς ἑλοῦσ’, αὐτὰρ βελέων **ἀπερύκοι** ἐρωήν (*Il*. 4. 539-542)				
	énthá	***ken***	*oukéti*	*érgon*	*ane:r*
	then	MOD	NEG	battle-ACC	man-NOM
	onósaito	***metelthó:n***	***hós***	***tis***	*ét’*
	underrate-3SG.OPT	enter-PTCP.NOM	REL-NOM	INDF-NOM	still
	áble:tos	*kai*	*anoútatos*	*oxéï*	*khalkô:i*
	unhit-NOM	and	unhurt-NOM	sharp-DAT	bronze-DAT
	dineúoi	*kata*	*mésson,*	*ágoi*	*dé*
	move-3SG.OPT	through	midst-ACC	lead-3SG.OPT	PTCL
	he	*Pallas Athé:ne:*	*kheiros*	*heloûs’,*	*autar*
	he-ACC	Athene-NOM	hand-GEN	take-PTCP.NOM	PTCL
	beléo:n	***aperúkoi***	*ero:é:n*		
	missiles-GEN	guard-3SG.OPT	onrush-ACC		
	‘Then a man **could** not any more **have entered** into the battle and **made light of it**, **one who** still unwounded by missile or by thrust of sharp bronze **would have moved** through their midst, Pallas Athene would lead by the hand, and **would have guarded him** from the onrush of missiles.’				

[9] One can compare the scalar implicature of an indefinite with negation such as “she didn’t give a red cent” = “she gave nothing at all” (Haspelmath 1997: 115).

By contrast, in the next example which is symmetrical in mood, we find a past-referring counterfactual indicative in the matrix clause from which the counterfactual implicature does not transfer to the subordinate clause. So even though the subordinate clause with a past indicative is governed by a matrix clause with a counterfactual past-referring indicative and there is formal symmetry of moods, no PCT takes place, because the reality status of the subordinate clause is not affected by the counterfactuality of the matrix clause[10]: *Aeneas would have struck* does not change the fact that the shield had guarded him *before*.

(3)	ἔνθά **κεν** Αἰνείας μὲν ἐπεσσύμενον **βάλε** πέτρῳ / ἢ κόρυθ' ἠὲ σάκος, **τό** οἱ **ἤρκεσε** λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον (*Il.* 20.288-289)					
	énthá	*ken*	*Aineías*	*men*	*epessúmenon*	*bále*
	there	MOD	Aeneas-NOM.SG	PTCL	rush-PTCP.ACC	hit-3SG.IND.AOR
	pétro:i	*e:*	*kóruth'*	*e:e*	*sákos*	
	rock-DAT	or	helmet-ACC	or	shield-ACC	
	tó	*hoi*	*é:rkese*	*lugron*	*ólethron*	
	REL-NOM	he-DAT	ward-3SG.OPT	woeful-ACC	ruin-ACC	
	'Then **would** Aeneas **have struck** him with the stone as he rushed on him, either on the helmet or on the shield **that had defended** him from woeful destruction.'					

La Roi (forthc) discusses predictive counterfactual conditionals, which he argues is one of the major types of counterfactual clause types in Ancient Greek (e.g. *If I had eaten more at breakfast, I would not be starving now*). The striking similarity between cases of PCT and predictive counterfactual conditionals is that the sequentiality of their events facilitates the pragmatic transfer of the counterfactual implicature. In example 3, on the contrary, there is no sequentiality between the events in the matrix and subordinate clause (Dancygier 2006: 73), meaning that the temporal relationship between the matrix clause and the subordinate clause is not iconic of the temporal order of events. By contrast, in example 4, the counterfactual implicature of the matrix clause (i.e. in that counterfactual scenario nothing would have parted them) transfers to the temporally sequential event of death enfolding them together (expressed by the attracted indicative without modal particle). The past indicative in the clause attracted through PCT ('[would have] enfolded us') thus refers to the counterfactual past which is, from

[10] Compare the existence of combinations of the counterfactual optative with non-counterfactual indicatives such as *Od.* 9.459 or 11.613.

a temporal and causal viewpoint, the outcome of the counterfactual scenario of the matrix clause.[11]

(4)	καί **κε** θάμ’ ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντες **ἐμισγόμεθ’**, οὐδέ **κεν** ἥμεας / ἄλλο **διέκρινεν** […]**,** / **πρίν** γ’ **ὅτε** δὴ θανάτοιο μέλαν νέφος **ἀμφεκάλυψεν**. (*Od*. 4.178-180)				
	kaí	***ke***	*thám’*	*enthád’*	*eóntes*
	and	MOD	often	there	be-PTCP.NOM
	emisgómeth’	*oudé*	***ken***	*é:meas*	*állo*
	mix-1PL.IMPF	nor	MOD	we-ACC	something-ACC
	diékrinen	***prín***	*g’*	***hóte***	*de:*
	part-3SG.IND.AOR	before	PTCL	when	PTCL
	thanátoio	*mélan*	*néphos*	***amphekálupsen***	
	death-GEN	black-NOM	cloud-NOM	enfold-3SG.IND.AOR	
	‘Then, living here, should we often have met together, nor **would** anything **have parted** us, (…), **until** the black cloud of death **enfolded us**.’				

Still, even when the events are sequential the counterfactual implicature may not transfer due to a speaker’s presupposition about the events, as we see in the next example from the Odyssey where, in contrast to example 2, a modal particle is added to a counterfactual subordinate clause which follows a counterfactual matrix clause. These lines are spoken by Odysseus when he wakes up on Ithaca but, crucially, thinks he is somewhere else and that the Phaeacians have not brought him back home but elsewhere. Here the counterfactuality of the matrix clause (i.e. I did not stay there and find another king to bring me home) does not transfer to the relative clause due to Odysseus’ wrong supposition about where he is, even though he actually has been entertained by them and sent on his homeward way (*épempe…néesthai*). In other words, the addition of the modal particle is crucial here, since it reveals the contrast between Odysseus’ supposition and his reality, or in linguistic terms between PCT and independent counterfactuality marking with the modal particle.

[11] Contrast the use of a post-posed temporal clause to refer to something that temporally precedes the action in the matrix clause as in *Il.* 12.465 ‘nobody could have stopped him except the gods, when he jumped in the gates’.

(5)	[πλάζομαι; αἴθ’ ὄφελον μεῖναι παρὰ Φαιήκεσσιν / αὐτοῦ·] ἐγὼ δέ κεν ἄλλον ὑπερμενέων βασιλήων / ἐξικόμην, ὅς **κέν** μ’ **ἐφίλει** καὶ **ἔπεμπε νέεσθαι** (*Od.* 13.204-206)						
	egô	*dé*	*ken*	*állon*	*upermenéôn*	*basile:ôn*	*eksikóme:n*
	I	PTC	MOD	other-ACC	mighty-GEN	kings-GEN	reach-3SG.IND.PFV
	hós	***kén***	*m’*	***ephílei***	*kai*	***épempe***	***néesthai***
	REL-NOM	MOD	me-ACC	love-3SG.IMPF	and	send-3SG.IND.IMPF	return-INF
	‘I wander? Would that I had remained there among the Phaeacians, and had then come to some other of the mighty kings, who would have **entertained me and sent me on my homeward way**.’						

Furthermore, in the following example, the counterfactuality of Odysseus’ present-referring wish can transfer to the temporally sequential event for the present, because there is an implicature from not having a contest (i.e. the counterfactual insubordinate wish) to not therefore being able to test (*peire:saímetha*) their work now. The subordinate purpose clause facilitates counterfactual implicature transfer, because purpose clauses prototypically have a “determined time reference” (Noonan 1985: 92; Schmidtke-Bode 2009: 43) in relation to the matrix clause situation (see more extensively section 3 for the relevance of this feature for the distribution of PCT across clause types).

(6)	Εὐρύμαχ’, **εἰ γὰρ** νῶϊν ἔρις ἔργοιο **γένοιτο** / ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ, […] **ἵνα πειρησαίμεθα** ἔργου (*Od.* 18.366-369)						
	Eurúmakh’,	***ei***	***gar***	*nô:ïn*	*éris*	*érgoio*	*génoito*
	Eurymachus-VOC	if	PTCL	we-DU.DAT	strife-NOM	work-GEN	be-3SG.OPT
	ho:re:i	*en*	*eiarinê:i*	***hína***	***peire:saímetha***	*érgou*	
	season-DAT	in	spring-DAT	so.that	test-1PL.OPT	work-GEN	
	‘Eurymachus, **if only we had** a contest in working in the season of spring […] **so that we tested** our work.’						

Now, in the next symmetrical mood example the optative is found in a subordinate dependent question and refers to the past but is not used counterfactually. This example is part

of an exceptional group of uses of the optative that refers to the past but is not counterfactual and thus resembles the uses of the optative after past forms of doubt in the indicative in Homer (Monro 1891: 278; Mendez Dosuna 1999: 345–346).

(7)	Τυδεΐδην δ’ οὐκ **ἂν γνοίης** ποτέροισι **μετείη** / ἠὲ μετὰ Τρώεσσιν **ὁμιλέοι** ἦ μετ’ Ἀχαιοῖς. (*Il*. 5.85-86)					
	Tudeïde:n	*d’*	*ouk*	***an***	***gnoíe:s***	*potéroisi*
	Tydeus’son-ACC	PTCL	NEG	MOD	know-2SG.OPT	REL-DAT
	meteíe:	*e:e*	*meta*	*Tró:essin*	***homiléoi***	*ê:*
	be.with-3SG.OPT	or	with	Trojans-DAT	side-3SG.OPT	or
	met’	*Akhaioîs*				
	with	Achaeans-DAT				
	‘But of Tydeus’ son you could not **have known** which army he **was with**, whether he **sided with** the Trojans or with the Achaeans.’					

Mendez Dosuna has argued that such uses of the optative, to express doubt from the speaker as to the validity of the information, are the historical source for the reportative evidential usage of the so-called oblique optative[12], with the optative in this early use expressing a form of epistemic distance with regards to the validity of the event expressed by the optative. An example such as (7) would fit this view, since the past-referring counterfactual (‘you would not have known’ i.e. if you had been there on the battlefield at that time) stresses the very fact of not being able to know. Also, the counterfactual implicature cannot transfer to the subordinate clause, because there is no causality between the matrix and subordinate clause. The subordinate clause has an oblique optative like non-counterfactual meaning which is temporally simultaneous with the past-referring counterfactual optative (Mendez Dosuna 1999).

Finally, I would like to discuss an asymmetrical example of counterfactual optative and indicative which displays PCT but would also fall outside the scope of traditional mood attraction (FOMA/FIMA). It is found in an answer by Proteus who tells Menelaos how he could have gotten home the quickest, something which he evidently has not, since it is his delay which brings him to try to find out from Proteus how to appease the gods and finally come home. As

[12] He also suggests that the oblique optative cannot be found replacing a counterfactual indicative, because it only replaces moods that present something with certainty, with which he refers to the subjunctive or past indicative (Mendez Dosuna 1999: 343–344).

explained by Allan (2013) the counterfactual verb *ó:phelles* is used as a counterfactual deontic modal verb 'you ought to have'. The optative in the subordinate clause is explained by Allan (2013: 17) as triggered by the past form ("The optative ἵκοιο in the final subordinate clause confirms that the main clause refers to a past"). That would in fact imply that the optative presents a type of oblique optative, but the optative does not express a pragmatic effect associated with the oblique optative (e.g. epistemic uncertainty, reportative evidential, indirect speech). Rather, the optative in the purpose clause expresses an event that is sequential to that expressed by the past counterfactual in the matrix clause and therefore, I argue, the counterfactual implicature can transfer to the subordinate clause: [matrix clause] you ought to have made offerings but you did not mean that [subordinate clause] you would not have reached your country *the quickest*. In other words, the counterfactuality of making offerings implicates the counterfactuality of reaching his homeland the quickest, as that has delayed him. Thus, contrary to what is said in the literature (see above in section 1), the optative in a subordinate clause dependent on a counterfactual matrix clause in a different mood can still display PCT. After all, the past-referring counterfactual optative is actually one of the expected mood options together with the counterfactual past indicative, because both still referred to the counterfactual past in Homeric Greek. Such a case then strongly calls into question traditional definitions of counterfactual mood attraction which are limited to the counterfactual indicative, based on formal symmetry and limited temporal grounds. It also underlines that PCT is a sign that the counterfactuality of the matrix verb *ó:phelles* is conventionalized.

(8)	ἀλλὰ μάλ' **ὄφελλες** Διί τ' ἄλλοισίν τε θεοῖσι ῥέξας ἱερὰ κάλ' ἀναβαινέμεν, **ὄφρα** τάχιστα σὴν ἐς πατρίδ' **ἵκοιο** (*Od*. 4.472-474)				
	alla	*mál'*	***ó:phelles***	*Dií*	*t'*
	but	surely	ought-2SG.IND.IMPF	Zeus-DAT	PTCL
	álloisín	*te*	*theoîsi*	*rhéxas*	*hiera*
	others-DAT	PTCL	gods-DAT	do-PTCP.NOM	offerings-ACC
	kál'	*anabainémen,*	***óphra***	*tákhista*	*sè:n*
	good-ACC	embark-INF	so.that	soonest	your-ACC
	es	*patríd'*	***híkoio***		
	to	country-ACC	reach-2SG.OPT		
	'But surely **you ought to have** made choice offerings to Zeus and the other gods before embarking, so that **you would have come** to your country **the quickest**'				

To sum up, we have found that traditional explanations of mood attraction based on only formal and temporal grounds (FOMA and FIMA) do not have sufficient explanatory power to explain counterfactual mood attraction in Archaic Greek. For example, we may find formal mood symmetry which is not mood attraction (ex. 3) or cases of formal mood symmetry but with different temporal reference (ex. 6) that fall outside the traditional temporal reference conditioned idea of mood attraction. Therefore I argue that counterfactual mood attraction actually depends on the pragmatic relationship between the matrix and subordinate clause, that is, whether the counterfactual implicature can transfer to the subordinate clause, as in example (6) or (8), or cannot as in example (3) or (7) where there is formal mood symmetry but no counterfactual mood attraction. If the event expressed in the subordinate clause is temporally sequential to that expressed by the counterfactual mood in the matrix clause, whether in the counterfactual optative or indicative, the counterfactual implicature transfers unless the event in the matrix clause is presented as an independent proposition with its own reality status.

Moreover, the pragmatic reinterpretation of traditional approaches of mood attraction proposed above can actually explain why certain clause types are favoured for PCT, since (i) relative clauses with an indefinite antecedent (e.g. anyone who) in the counterfactual matrix clause are by default implication counterfactual through the scalar implication (anyone who=all those) that all of that indefinite kind are affected by what is said about them in the matrix clause, (ii) post-posed temporal clauses in cases of FIMA/FOMA are of the posterior type (until/before) in Archaic Greek expressing events sequential to that in the matrix clause and thereby open themselves up to PCT, and (iii) post-posed[13] purpose clauses have a temporal reference predetermined by their matrix clause and the events expressed by them are therefore not only naturally iconic from a temporal perspective (i.e. sequential) but also can easily be (although need not be, section 3) also causally iconic. As such, the notion of pragmatic counterfactuality transfer (PCT) has more explanatory power than traditional conceptions of mood attraction. Moreover, it is similar to how counterfactual implicature transfer is explained in predictive counterfactual conditionals (e.g. *If I had eaten more at breakfast, I would not be starving now*). In those cases, the counterfactual implicature from the conditional clause (e.g. I did *not* eat enough at breakfast) pragmatically implicates[14] the counterfactuality of the matrix clause (i.e. I am saying that I am starving). Moreover, as with PCT, we find both asymmetrical

[13] By contrast, pre-posed subordinate clauses are often used in an illocutionary way e.g. '(just) so you know' *hína eidê:s/eidê:te*, see la Roi (2021).
[14] Cf. Wakker (1994: 301) and Declerck and Reed (2001: 107–108).

(counterfactual indicative+optative) and symmetrical (counterfactual optative+optative) examples in Archaic Greek, because predictive counterfactual conditionals similarly can be marked asymmetrically in Archaic Greek: *Il.* 22.20 counterfactual optative and counterfactual optative, *Il.* 16.618 counterfactual indicative and counterfactual indicative, and *Il.* 2.80 counterfactual indicative and counterfactual optative.[15]

3 Counterfactual mood attraction in Classical Greek

In Classical Greek, there is less formal variation in the marking of counterfactual mood attraction, since the optative cannot be used counterfactually anymore (la Roi 2022a). However, PCT occurs with more clause types than in Archaic Greek and more than mentioned in the literature (e.g. *pace* Kühner and Gerth 1898: 257–258, cf. the italicized): relative, temporal, purpose, *result, and comparative clauses.* Crucially, when such subordinate clauses are counterfactual after a preceding non-counterfactual matrix clause, they need the modal particle as a rule, e.g. in a relative clause Ar. *Lys.* 109 or D. 45.13.10 (*pace* Goodwin 1897: 214–215), a dependent question Isoc. 11.8.4, a purpose clause Pl. *Lg.* 967b3, a causal clause E. *Alc.* 555, or a result clause Lys. 14.27 or Isoc. 16.7.4). The first example below is a present-referring counterfactual wish with an indefinite subject that is elaborated on by a relative clause.[16] As in example (2), the counterfactual implicature transfers due to the denial of the indefinite subject in the matrix clause: there is no kinsman or relative for me here now, so there is nobody to give me such criticism (i.e. a scalar implicature). Note that the events in the matrix clause (expressed by the counterfactual insubordinate wish in the indicative, *eith'ôphelén einaí* 'if only would be') and the subordinate clause both refer to the present but have a presuppositional bound, because being present necessarily precedes giving criticism.

(9)	[**εἴθ' ὤφελέν** μοι κηδεμὼν ἢ ξυγγενὴς **εἶναί τις**] **ὅστις** τοιαῦτ' **ἐνουθέτει**. (Ar. *V.* 731)		
	hóstis	*toiaût'*	*enouthétei*
	REL-NOM	such-ACC	rebuke-3SG.IND.IMPF
	'[**If only there would be some** kinsman or relative] **who would give** me such **criticism**.'		

[15] Note that predictive counterfactual conditionals of a counterfactual optative in the conditional clause followed by a counterfactual optative in the matrix clause are not found, because the counterfactual indicative has already replaced the counterfactual optative in past-referring instances in conditional subordinate clauses (la Roi 2022a).
[16] Other examples are Pl. *Ap.* 20a7, 38b1, *Men.* 94c7, *Phlb.* 22b4 and Is. 2.25.2.

In the following example, we find confirmation of the similarity between counterfactual implicature transfer from the conditional to the matrix clause in predictive counterfactuals and from the matrix to the subordinate clause in PCT: the counterfactual implicature transfers from the counterfactual condition to the matrix clause and subsequently to the attracted subordinate clause. Since Socrates has no money (the counterfactual conditional in the indicative), he could not have proposed a fine (the counterfactual matrix clause) nor have paid a sum that large (the attracted subordinate clause). Thus, counterfactual mood attraction is actually pragmatically conditioned, PCT.

(10)	[**εἰ** μὲν γὰρ **ἦν** μοι χρήματα,] **ἐτιμησάμην ἂν** χρημάτων ὅσα **ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν** (Pl. *Ap.* 38b1)				
	etime:sáme:n	*an*	*khre:máto:n*	*hósa*	*émellon*
	estimate-1SG.IND.AOR	MOD	money-GEN	which-ACC	be.to-1SG.IND.IMPF
	ekteísein				
	pay-INF				
	[**'If I had** money], **I would have proposed** a fine, as large as **I were to pay**				

In fact, we can have PCT from a subordinate conditional clause to a relative clause which is dependent on it[17], underlining that counterfactual implicature transfer from the matrix clause is the motor behind PCT. In example (11) the counterfactual premise of there not being a stronger authority in the city than the Thirty tyrants (matrix clause) implicates that such a non-existing authority could also not have ordered him (attracted relative clause). The counterfactuality from the conditional clause therefore transfers to the relative clause dependent on it through PCT.[18]

(11)	**εἰ** μὲν γάρ **τις ἦν** ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴ ἰσχυροτέρα αὐτῆς, **ὑφ' ἧς αὐτῷ προσετάττετο** παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἀνθρώπους ἀπολλύναι [ἴσως ἂν εἰκότως αὐτῷ συγγνώμην εἶχετε] (Lys. 12.29)				
	ei	*men*	*gár*	***tis***	***ê:n***
	if	PTCL	PTCL	INDF-NOM	be-3SG.IND.IMPF
	en	*tê:i*	*pólei*	*arkhe:*	*iskhurotéra*
	in	ART-DAT	city-DAT	power-NOM	stronger-NOM

[17] See also Isoc. 13.1, E. *IA* 1213, Pl. *Prot.* 327a5 and *Chrm.* 171d3.
[18] The same phenomenon is found with a result clause which is dependent on a counterfactual condition preceding the counterfactual matrix clause, see D. 39.26.2.

	autê:s,	***huph' hê:s***	***autô:i***	***prosetátteto***	*para*
	POSS	under.which	he-DAT	order-3SG.IND.IMPF	against
	to	*díkaion*	*anthró:pous*	*apollúnai*	
	ART-ACC	justice-ACC	people-ACC	destroy-INF	
	'For **had there been some** stronger authority in the city, **whose orders were given him** to destroy people in defiance of justice, [you might perhaps have some reason for pardoning him].'				

At the same time, as discussed above, formal symmetry between a counterfactual past indicative in the matrix clause and a past indicative in the subordinate clause is not necessarily PCT, as shown by the following example where the relative clause expresses something which temporally precedes the present-referring counterfactual wish. Standard grammars explain such examples as not displaying FIMA because the subordinate clause is not "intimately connected with the thought of the clause on which it depends" (Smyth and Messing 1968: 489).[19] From a pragmatic perspective, however, we can clarify such intuitive qualifications by pointing to the lack of sequentiality and causal impossibility of counterfactual implicature transfer from the matrix to the subordinate clause.

(12)	**ἠβουλόμην** δ' **ἂν** ὑμῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι φανερὸν **οἷος** περὶ αὐτὸν ἐγενόμην (Isoc. 19.28.1)					
	e:boulóme:n	*d'*	***an***	*humîn*	*hoîós*	*t'*
	wish-1SG.IMPF	PTCL	MOD	you-DAT	able-NOM	PTCL
	eînai	*poiê:sai*	*phaneron*	***hoîos***	*peri*	*auton*
	be-INF	make-INF	clear-ACC	REL-NOM	around	he-ACC
	egenóme:n					
	be-1SG.AOR					
	'I wish I could make clearly apparent to you **the nature of which I was** around him'					

This brings us to the role of clause types for FIMA and PCT, since some clauses have been said to lack mood attraction due to their relationship with the matrix clause, e.g. dependent statements, dependent fear clauses and dependent questions for being "innerlich abhängig",

[19] Similarly, Kühner and Gerth (1898: 258–259) who speak about the same mental conception in the matrix and subordinate clause of FOMA and FIMA.

internally dependent (Kühner and Gerth 1898: 259). Indeed, as observed above, with counterfactual mood attraction in relative clauses and purpose clauses, there is an inherent relation (e.g. scalar implicature or temporal-causal connection) which facilitates the transfer of the counterfactual implicature to the attracted clause. This explains why relative clauses and purpose clauses represent the majority of examples of PCT in my corpus for Classical Greek. Yet, note that these clauses can also have a modal particle and counterfactual indicative, for example when following a non-counterfactual matrix clause (see la Roi 2022a who records 46 of such relative clauses, e.g. Th. 8.66.5, but only 1 such purpose clause). For similar semantic-pragmatic reaons, we find PCT with a temporal clause when the temporal clause specifies a time frame (esp. *prín* 'before' or *héo:s* 'until') within the same counterfactual world as the matrix clause (e.g. 'the senate would have carried on the torture until (*mékhri hoû*) they saw fit' D. 53.25.4[20]), or with a purpose clause when the counterfactuality of the purpose is created by the matrix clause (e.g. sureties ought to have been taken then so that (*hó:s*) X. *An.* 7.6.23.2). However, in example (13) we find neither FIMA nor PCT, but a present in the dependent statement. This illustrates that both the speaker sceptically accepts that the Persian is only heading towards the Scythians, and this proposition is not altered by the counterfactuality of the Persian being able to show that he is (see the matrix clause and preceding context).

(13)	[εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἡμέας μούνους ἐστρατηλάτεε ὁ Πέρσης […] χρῆν αὐτὸν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενον ἰέναι οὕτω ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέρην,] καὶ **ἂν ἐδήλου** πᾶσι **ὡς** ἐπὶ Σκύθας **ἐλαύνει** καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. (Hdt. 4.118.15-20)						
	kai	***an***	***edé:lou***	*pâsi*	***ho:s***	*epi*	
	and	MOD	show-2SG.IMPF	all-DAT	that	to	
	Skúthas	***elaúnei***	*kai*	*ouk*	*epi*	*tous*	*állous*
	Scythia-ACC	march-3SG.PRS	and	NEG	to	ART-ACC	other-ACC
	'[if indeed the Persian were marching against us alone […], he ought to leave others alone and make straight for us,] and **would show** everyone that Scythia and no other country **is his goal**.'						

[20] See also Lys. 12.1, D. 20.96, Pl. *Men.* 84c5, 86d5, *Grg.* 506b5.

By contrast, in example (1) the counterfactuality of the matrix clause (he would not have stopped earlier) transfers to the attracted comparative clause even though it is internally dependent on the matrix clause (viz. *proteron è:* 'earlier than').

Furthermore, the marking of polarity in cases of PCT also reveals the similarity to counterfactual implicature transfer in predictive counterfactual conditionals. The negation in the attracted purpose clause in (14) targets the reversed polarity of the matrix clause. We thus could paraphrase the causal relation between the matrix and attracted clause as: It does not have a mind and a voice according to the rule of a messenger, so that it does not waver between two minds. The negator in the attracted clause targets the counterfactuality of the matrix clause, that is, its reversed polarity.[21]

(14)	**εἴθ' εἶχε** φωνὴν ἔμφρον' ἀγγέλου δίκην, **ὅπως** δίφροντις οὖσα **μὴ 'κινυσσόμην** (A. *Ch*. 195-196)				
	eíth'	***eîkhe***	*pho:ne:n*	*émphron'*	*angélou*
	if.only	have-3SG.IMPF	voice-ACC	wise-ACC	messenger-GEN
	díke:n,	***ópo:s***	*díphrontis*	*oûsa*	*me:*
	rule-ACC	in.order.that	doubting-NOM	be-PTCP.NOM	NEG
	'kinussóme:n				
	waver-1SG.IMPF				
	'**If only it had** a wise voice according to the rule of a messenger, **in order that I wouldn't waver** between two minds.'				

Furthermore, in example (15), the negator *ouk* targets the counterfactuality of the preceding condition, a causal relationship that we could paraphrase as: I cannot block my hearing (conditional) and therefore cannot refrain from shutting off my wretched self (matrix clause, with double negation interpreted as single negation) in order that I am blind and deaf (attracted purpose clause[22]). Thus, the counterfactual implicature transfer is revealed by the negation in the matrix clause which targets the reversed polarity of the conditional and matrix clause.[23] This transfer is after all also why Oedipus cannot be deaf as well as blind.

[21] For a comparable example with negation markers in both the counterfactual markers in the matrix and attracted clause, see Pl. *Smp.* 181d7-8.
[22] For more examples of PCT with purpose clauses, see, for example, S. *El.* 1132, A. *Pr.* 154, Ar. *Ec.* 151, Isoc. 15.51.1 or Lys. 3.21.2 or 3.44.3.
[23] See la Roi (2023) for the role of polarity reversal in counterfactuals and similar constructions.

(15)	[ἀλλ’ εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ’ ἦν πηγῆς δι’ ὤτων φραγμός], **οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην** τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῆσαι τοὐμὸν ἄθλιον δέμας, **ἵν’ ἦ** τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων **μηδέν** (S. *OT*. 1387-1389)					
	ouk	***an***	***eskhóme:n***	*to*	***me:***	***apoklê:isai***
	NEG	MOD	can-1SG.AOR	ART-ACC	NEG	shut.off-INF
	toumon	*áthlion*	*démas,*	***hín’***	***ê:***	*tuphlós*
	mine-ACC	sad-ACC	body-ACC	so.that	be-3SG.IMPF	blind-NOM
	te kai	*klúo:n*	***me:dén***			
	and	hear-PTCP.NOM	nothing-ACC			
	‘[Why, if there had been a means of blocking the stream of hearing through my ears], I **could not refrain from shutting off** my wretched self, **in order that I were blind and deaf** […]’					

These findings raise the question how to account for other alleged cases of counterfactual mood attraction which do not have a counterfactual in the matrix clause (Goodwin 1889: 120–121; Kühner and Gerth 1898: 285; Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 28–30), viz. *tí ou(k)* ‘why not’+ past indicative questions which are followed by a final clause with a past indicative. Using example (16), Revuelta Puigdollers concludes that the presence of the final clause with a past tense in this construction is the same as the final clause with a past tense depending on a matrix clause with a counterfactual verb: “the counterfactuality (conversational and conventionalized implicatures) of these constructions (*ti ou* + past in interrogatives and *eboulome:n* (*an*) ‘I would have wanted’) is proved by the behavior of final clauses depending on them, since they take the past tense as they usually do when they are under the scope of explicit counterfactual expressions (past + *an*)” (Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 29–30). I would argue that his interpretation conflates the semantics of the construction (why not past event) with the pragmatic implicature that the speaker wants the addressee to infer. After all, ‘why not’ combined with a past tense does not express a counterfactual past in itself (i.e. considered false by the speaker), but only something unrealized which is negated. For obvious rhetorical effect (see *euthús* ‘at once’), Oedipus presents it as a possible past that Cithaeron had killed him instead of receiving him and therefore that he never revealed his origin in the past. Note the sequentiality between the matrix and purpose clause. Now, the pragmatic interpretation of the

question is a directive reproach[24]: you should have killed me at once so that I could never have revealed to mortals what was my origin. It is only in the pragmatic analysis that a counterfactual interpretation of the whole sentence is implicated: you should have killed me so that I would never have revealed my origin.

(16)	[ἰὼ Κιθαιρών, τί μ᾽ ἐδέχου;] **τί μ᾽ οὐ** λαβὼν **ἔκτεινας** εὐθύς, **ὡς ἔδειξα μήποτε** ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔνθεν ἦ γεγώς; (S. *OT* 1391-1393)				
	tí	***m'***	***ou***	*labo:n*	***ékteinas***
	why	me-ACC	NEG	take-PTCP.NOM	kill-2SG.AOR
	euthús	***ho:s***	***édeixa***	***mé:pote***	*emauton*
	at.once	so.that	show-1SG.AOR	never	myself-ACC
	anthró:poisin	*énthen*	*ê:*	*gegó:s*	
	humans-DAT	where.from	be-1SG.IMPF	be-PTCP.NOM	
	'[Ah, Cithaeron, why did you receive me?] **Why did you** not take me and **kill me** at once, **so that** I **had never revealed** to mortals what was my origin?'				

Thus, such constructions should not be put on the same level as cases of PCT (*pace* Goodwin 1889: 120–121; Kühner and Gerth 1898: 285 who cite counterfactual examples next to only two of these instances; Revuelta Puigdollers 2017: 28–30).

In sum, PCT provides a pragmatic basis for comprehensively explaining cases previously explained as FIMA. As discussed in this section, PCT occurs across different clause types (e.g. relative, temporal, purpose, result, and comparative clauses). The absence of the modal particle in those cases where they are found in cases of PCT is the result of the transfer of the pragmatic implicature from the matrix clause to the subordinate clause. In fact, the striking similarities between the counterfactual implicature transfer from conditionals to the main clause in predictive counterfactual conditionals and cases of PCT, as well as the similarities in how the counterfactual implicature cancels negated propositions (i.e. the polarity reversal from negative to positive) confirm that the formal side of counterfactual mood attraction has a pragmatic basis. Therefore, the next section will assess whether the formal phenomena collated by non-

[24] Cf. also Kühner and Gerth (1898: 258). Nijk (2021: 4–5) in a recent discussion of the behavior of tense and aspect in these *ti ou(k)* questions calls this use the indignant interpretation and suggests that a hortative interpretation of (16) is out of the question "as the opportunity for carrying out the designated event has expired". This would seem too strict of an interpretation of hortative, since directives can concern the past and still exhort someone at present. For example, if a parent sees that his son has not finished his homework before today's deadline, he could say "why did you not finish it yesterday?" or "you should have finished it yesterday" in order to get him to finish it now. Cf. the directive values of past-referring counterfactual modal verbs in Ancient Greek, Ruiz Yamuza (2021).

counterfactual mood attraction (FOMA and FSMA, i.e. with the optative and subjunctive), might also be pragmatically conditioned.

4 Moving beyond mood attraction

An example such as (17), where Trygaeus explains what the Moon and the Sun hope to gain by betraying the gods and plotting with the barbarians, receives the traditional explanation of FOMA stating that a subjunctive or future is 'expected' in the purpose clause but here the "mood attracts to that of the potential βούλοιντ' ἂν" [*boúloint' àn* 'they would want'] (van Emde Boas *et al*. 2019: 501).[25]

(17)	[ὁτιὴ νὴ Δία ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑμῖν θύομεν, τούτοισι δὲ οἱ βάρβαροι θύουσι.] διὰ τοῦτ' εἰκότως βούλοιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς πάντας ἐξολωλέναι, ἵνα τὰς τελετὰς λάβοιεν αὐτοὶ τῶν θεῶν. (Ar. *Pax* 411-413)				
	dia	*toût'*	*eikóto:s*	***boúloint'***	***an***
	through	DEM	naturally	want-3PL.OPT	MOD
	e:mâs	*pántas*	*exolo:lénai*	***hína***	*tas*
	us-ACC	all-ACC	destroy-INF	so.that	ART-ACC
	teletas	***láboien***	*autoi*	*tô:n*	*theô:n*
	rites-ACC	take-3PL.OPT	self-NOM	ART-GEN	gods-GEN
	'[Simple: we sacrifice to you and the barbarians sacrifice to them;] so naturally **they'd want** us all annihilated, **in order that** they **could take** over the rites of the gods themselves.'				

I would argue, however, that we could do without such an artificial explanation, because it seems to be based on preconceived expectations of mood symmetry and a strict temporal reference understanding of mood usage.[26] Rather, the optative appears to be used here in its standard way of expressing non-subjective epistemic modality (la Roi 2019) of a potential event in the present (as here) or the future, i.e. something may take place but the speaker does not take epistemic responsibility for that. In other words, Trygaeus purposely presents it as a

[25] The same explanation is found in commentaries, e.g. on this example Olson (1998: 158) citing Goodwin (1889: 60–61).

[26] This issue probably connects to the understanding of moods in terms of tenses by earlier grammars as reflected by their discussions of "the tenses of the moods" (Goodwin 1889: 22). See la Roi forthc who shows that the classifications of conditionals by grammars have similarly been guided by temporal reference and chance of fulfillment (i.e. mood choice) as main criteria, although pragmatic functions cover functional variation in temporal reference and mood asymmetries.

possibility that the Moon and Sun could successfully complete their plot to overturn all the gods and receive their rites, i.e. the purpose of their present wish.[27] After all, this lower degree of likelihood corresponds to reality[28] as one may want to do such thing to the gods now, but *given* that they are the gods it is unlikely that they would succeed in taking the rites from the gods (*láboien*). Assuming an 'original' or 'replaced' subjunctive in the matrix clause is unnecessary both because the temporal reference and epistemic likelihood is pragmatically conditioned by the potential optative in the matrix clause.

Thus, an alternative interpretation of such traditional cases of FOMA that I would like to propose in part actually traces back to a discrepancy found in the literature on how to interpret mood attraction/assimilation. Whereas most grammarians view mood attraction as a true form of replacement and thereby imply that, for example, the optative mood is used as to replace the expected subjunctive (Smyth and Messing 1968: 489; e.g. Crespo, Conti and Maquieira 2003: 297; van Emde Boas *et al*. 2019: 501), some had already stated that the mood in cases of mood attraction retains its own force (esp. Kühner and Gerth 1898: 254–258). In fact, Kühner and Gerth have observed some of the problems that have troubled accounts of mood attraction more generally. Their definition of mood attraction reflects this, as they do not use a temporal reference criterion for mood attraction but rather state that the mood in both the matrix and subordinate clause share the same mental conception by the speaker.[29] With regards to the idea of replacement of the subjunctive by the optative, they stated emphatically that an optative has its own force when found in a place where one might have expected a subjunctive.[30] Since they suggest that the mood in the 'attracted' subordinate clause retains its own meaning, it would actually follow that there is no genuine 'attraction' or 'assimilation' and that the phenomena of FSMA (which Kühner and Gerth do not even acknowledge), FOMA and FIMA as conceived by most grammarians nowadays do not have enough explanatory power (as I argue in this paper). In my view, they already are hinting to this hypothesis (see the translated quote of Kühner and Gerth 1898: 258), an hypothesis that this paper substantiates:

> For the modal symmetry of subordinate clauses with the main clause discussed above (*which are most clearly revealed in the optatival and unreal conditional clauses* § 576

[27] Note also the present-referring potential optative would not even qualify as FOMA in stricter definitions of FOMA based on future reference such as Smyth and Messing (1968: 489).
[28] See, however, Wakker (1994: 113) who astutely observes that the choice of mood need not always correspond to reality but may depend on the speaker's goal, e.g. to present something unlikely as possible with a potential optative.
[29] Kühner and Gerth (1898: 254).
[30] Kühner and Gerth (1898: 252).

> and 574), the term modal assimilation has become usual, *which of course should not tempt to the opinion that the subordinate clause due to the predominant influence of the main clause were imposed with a mood which did not belong to it*. Much more the agreement is almost everywhere based on that the subordinate clause arises from the same mental opinion of attitude of the speaker as the main clause, that is, likewise either constitutes a purely subjective conception, for which the optative is the corresponding utterance form (cf. also no. 3), or the conception of an unrealized action, which in Greek usage is accordingly expressed in the past (cf. §391, 5). *When the subordinate clause is not part of the same mental conception as the main clause, then it will not receive the same mood*. (Kühner and Gerth 1898: 258, my italics)

They signal three points which require further qualification. Firstly, mood attraction should not be interpreted as the main clause mood causing a change to a mood in the subordinate clause although, as discussed above, this is how mood attraction is mostly interpreted. Secondly, there are asymmetrical mood examples, where the mood in the subordinate clause is not attracted because the event in the subordinate clause is not conceived in the same mental way by the speaker (see more precise pragmatic analysis above and below). This evidence in fact supports the idea that the mood in cases of FOMA has its own value. Thirdly and finally, they compare the phenomenon of mood attraction to the mood symmetry found in conditional clauses. I think that the fact that they put these two phenomena on the same level illustrates that they see these mood symmetries as a merely formal phenomenon, especially since the moods retain their own force in their view.[31] After all, it is common knowledge that the moods in conditional sentences need not be symmetrical (Goodwin 1889: 188–195; la Roi forthc), because that is a didactic simplification of the complex conditional system of Ancient Greek. To sum up, not only can mood attraction be interpreted without the notions of FOMA, FIMA and FSMA, there is existing evidence suggesting that FOMA is only relevant from a didactic formal perspective. This can be illustrated further by a contrastive example of a wish optative followed by an allegedly attracted optative (example (18)) and followed by a subjunctive (example (19)). In example (18) Orestes is addressing an absent goddess to come to his aid using a wish optative. Since the wish refers to a possibility for which Orestes would have to be very lucky to actually happen, it follows that the sequential possibility dependent on it in the purpose clause is also merely potential, viz. that she would also liberate him from his troubles.

[31] This would also explain why instances of a preposed conditional with optative and a main clause with optative are cited as instances of FOMA in some grammars (e.g. Kühner and Gerth 1898: 256).

(18)	**ἔλθοι** (…) **ὅπως γένοιτο** τῶνδ’ ἐμοὶ λυτήριος. (A. *Eu.* 296-297)					
	élthoi	*hópo:s*	*génoito*	*tô:nd’*	*emoi*	*luté:rios*
	come-3SG.OPT	in.order.that	be-3SG.OPT	DEM-GEN.PL	me-DAT	liberator-NOM
	‘**May she come here** (…) **in order that she may be** my liberator from these troubles.’					

By contrast, the wish for immediate death (*tethnaíe:n* die-1SG.OPT) in (19) presupposes that he would not remain here, since he would be dead, and therefore warrants the use of the more certain subjunctive. In sum, the mood in both examples have their own force in representing a possibility as potential (17, 18) or likely (19), while the pragmatic relation between the two events clarifies why a speaker would use the optative or subjunctive in the subordinate clause.

(19)	[αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι,] **ἵνα μὴ** ἐνθάδε **μένω** καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν (Pl. *Ap*. 28d2-3)				
	hína	***me:***	*entháde*	***méno:***	*katagélastos*
	so.that	NEG	here	stay-SBJV	laughed.at-NOM
	para	*ne:usi*	*koro:nisin’*		
	at	ships-DAT	curved-DAT		
	[“May I die right now,’ he says, ‘when I have made the unjust man pay the penalty,] **in order not to remain here** a laughing stock beside the crooked-beaked ships.”				

In fact, the same explanation holds in other subordinate clause types, for example relative clauses in such FOMA contexts. Example (20), presented as FOMA by van Emde Boas *et al*. (2019: 501), actually has a contextual motivation for the optative in the relative clause. A man from Sybaris had fallen out of a chariot and seriously injured his head. He was an inexperienced driver. A friend of his stood over him and then reproaches him in the following way:

(20)	“**ἔρδοι τις** ἢν ἕκαστος **εἰδείη** τέχνην.” [οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεχ’ εἰς τὰ Πιττάλου.] (Ar. *V.* 1431-1432)					
	érdoi	*tis*	*he:n*	*hékastos*	*eideíe:*	*tékhne:n*
	do-3SG.OPT	INDF	REL-ACC	each-NOM	know-3SG.OPT	craft-ACC
	‘Let each practice the craft he knows.’ [So why don’t you do the same and run off to Pittalus’ clinic!’]					

As explained in the commentary by Biles and Olson (2015: 492–493), the wish is meant as a witty reproach to his friend that it was stupid to try a trade that is not your own and therefore he should take your crying to Pittalus, a proverbially sarcastic turn of phrase. The choice for the optatives is ideally suited to this context, as, on the one hand, the generalized wish (*érdoi tis*) is clearly to be interpreted personally by the hearer[32], and, on the other hand, to present what one would know (*eideíe:*) in the optative as a mere possibility is obviously instructed by the fact that his friend clearly does not know this trade, that is, a form of negative scalar implicature from possibility: anyone would know what he does but you clearly do not. Thus, an explanation in terms of FOMA is unnecessary.[33] At the same time, the optative in the subordinate clause is pragmatically conditioned by the generalized wish optative in the matrix clause.

5 Concluding remarks

It has been argued in this paper that what has been called counterfactual mood attraction is a pragmatically conditioned morphosyntactic phenomenon. The morphosyntactic rule whereby a modal particle is not needed in a counterfactual non-conditional subordinate clause has a pragmatic basis: it is determined by whether the counterfactual implicature from the matrix clause (i.e. main or subordinate clause) transfers to the subordinate clause, called pragmatic counterfactuality transfer (PCT). For PCT to occur, the events in both clauses are at least sequential (i.e. temporally iconic) but, more importantly, causally dependent on each other in the same way as a counterfactual implicature in a predictive counterfactual conditional transfers to the apodosis (*If I had eaten more at breakfast, [then it follows that] I would not be starving now*). PCT may take place in asymmetrical counterfactual mood contexts in Archaic Greek due to the fact that the counterfactual optative was still around but is being filtered out (la Roi 2022a). The transfer of counterfactual implicature is confirmed by the scope of negation in such sentences as it targets the polarity reversal brought about by counterfactuality. PCT also sets itself apart from constructions likened to them in the past (e.g. *tí ou(k)*+past interrogative), as in that construction the counterfactual implicature is merely implied pragmatically whereas the counterfactuality of markers in the matrix clauses of PCT is conventionalized. Similarly, non-counterfactual "mood attraction" cannot sufficiently explain the distribution of moods in

[32] For the indirect directive effects of the wish optative and its different interactive functions, see la Roi (2020: 224–229).
[33] Cf. also the usage of "the optative properly used" in purpose clauses when dependent on a present indicative (Goodwin 1889: 115).

symmetrical and asymmetrical contexts because mood usage in subordinate clauses is both semantically conditioned (i.e. mood meaning in context) and pragmatically conditioned by the meaning of the matrix clause. Finally, from the perspective of the language system of Ancient Greek, this pragmatic re-evaluation of non-counterfactual mood attraction makes more sense, because the so-called oblique optative is also not obligatory and has its own distinct force in asymmetrical morphosyntactic contexts.

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